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Yves Citton 
 
Literary Attention: The Hairy Politics of Details 
 
 
What can literary studies bring to our experience? The fact that many scholars, on both 
sides of the Atlantic, have recently felt the need to address this question is usually interpreted 
as a symptom of a “crisis” in the literary profession. Less students, less jobs, less 
attractiveness, less impact, less prestige: the study of literature seems bound to follow the path 
taken by the study of theology during the 19
th
 century. Against this background feeling of 
gloom and doom, the steady flow of manifestoes in favor of literary studies often sounds 
overblown by wishful thinking. Literary interpretations, as performed in the classroom, are 
supposed to ground, shape and expand our moral consciousness, set the foundations for an 
alternative to the suicidal logics of global capitalism, and/or provide an affordable gymnastics 
training us to become successful among the young sharks of the creative class… Such 
contradictory and overambitious goals have provided an understandable backlash among 
more realistic, cautious or cynical colleagues. 
Phil Watts never indulged in theoretical or programmatic gesturing. As a teacher, as a 
scholar, as a member of faculty committees, as a departmental chair, he was well aware of the 
challenges faced by our profession. As a reader and as a thinker, he eagerly followed the 
debates about the constant reconfiguration of our discipline—and his interest in Jacques 
Rancière and Roland Barthes bears witness to his profound engagement with literary theory, 
in its connection with intellectual history and political philosophy. But, to my knowledge, he 
never attempted directly, openly and frontally to intervene in the theoretical discussions about 
the evolution and the future of our profession. 
This may be due to his profound humility: there is an inherent arrogance in the 
theoretical mode of discourse, which went against the grain of his self-effacing persona. But I 
believe it is also due to a deeper form of wisdom and intelligence. Phil understood that the 
best way to defend the study of literature was to actually perform it, rather than merely to 
preach it. As a teacher, as a scholar, as a family man and as a community member, he taught 
by example, rather than by admonition or reproach. The best thing we can do to defend, 
improve and expand our practice of literature is to follow his example.  
We can do so by attempting to imitate him, in his kindness, generosity, caution and 
courage—and this is by far the best tribute we can bring to his memory: making his example 
as alive as possible in and through as many of us as possible. We can also try to understand 
what he did that was so loveable and inspiring—and this is what I will attempt to do here. 
Analyzing what Phil Watts did to and with literature may help us assert more powerfully the 
value of literary studies in our contemporary world. My thesis will be simple and 
straightforward: what Phil Watts’ example teaches us is that literature, today, consists in a 
certain exercise and practice of attention to details. 
 
Enlarging the Scope, Narrowing the Focus 
The first question raised by my assertion is probably: attention to what? Of course, Phil 
Watts studied and taught literary texts: Céline, Sartre, Éluard, Camus, but also Kateb Yacine 
or Mohamed Dib. But his dramatically short career displays a constant and irresistible 
movement of expansion—from canonical metropolitan literary authors to Algerian writers, to 
philosophers like Rancière, and, more and more, to cinema. If Phil Watts taught and studied 
“French literature”, then we must enlarge the scope of what we call “literature”, in order to 
include in it not only Francophone texts, but also forgotten films, obscure film critiques, as 
well as aesthetical and political debates which seem to have very little to do with what was so 
far called “literature”.  
Hence the first feature in the portrait of literary studies I am proposing under the 
inspiration of Phil Watts’ example: literary studies can no longer be defined by certain 
classes of objects of inquiry (isolating a pre-determined corpus), but by a certain type of 
attention, which can be devoted to any product of human intelligence and which I will try to 
define as literary attention. 
Whether “reading” Céline, Camus, Kateb Yacine, Jacques Rancière, André Bazin, 
François Truffaut, Sergei Eisenstein or Jules Dassin, Phil Watts “literarized” his objects of 
inquiry by looking at them with a unique blend of curiosity, sensitivity, finesse, expectations, 
care and love. Because Phil was half-French, in his mind as in his genealogy and in his 
family, he knew that attention implies both a certain intensity of scrutiny (être attentif) and a 
certain offering of care (être attentionné). All of those who have been fortunate to meet him, 
even briefly, have experienced how attentionné Phil was as a person. His generosity and 
selflessness led him constantly to pay attention first to the needs and affects of others. 
Similarly, all of his writings bear witness to the carefulness with which he constructed 
historical contextualization or linguistic connotations, in order to do justice to the sentence or 
to the scene he was analyzing. He was as obsessively careful in his interpretations as he was 
selflessly caring towards the people around him.  
Hence a second feature in the ideal portrait provided by Phil Watts: literary studies 
endeavor to teach us a certain practice of care, bearing both (and inseparably) on cultural 
goods and on the people that surround us. Reading a narrative, analyzing a poem, 
commenting a film scene: such attentional practices always involve a sensory object, to which 
we ought to provide our most discriminating intelligence, and other subjects, to whom we 
ought to give our most loving concerns. Whether in class, in an article, in a book, or sitting at 
a café with friends, literary interpretation constructs a reciprocally caring micro-community 
by refining our common sensitivity to previously unnoticed features of the cultural goods 
under consideration. Becoming more attentif to the object of interpretation goes hand-in-hand 
with becoming more attentionné towards the interpretive community. 
This double movement points to a third trait in the figure of the literary scholar and 
teacher: at the same times as it expands the scope of what comes under consideration, literary 
attention consists in narrowing our common focus on apparently minor and insignificant 
features of the sensory or linguistic data. The example of carefulness provided by Phil Watts 
invites us to pay attention to details. To do literary work is to notice unremarkable details and 
to renew our perceptions and understandings of our world on the basis of these details. In 
order to illustrate this point, both theoretically and practically, I will now turn to a detailed 
analysis of a minor detail in the book Phil Watts left unfinished about Roland Barthes and 
Cinema. 
 
A Bald Interpretation of Hair 
Phil Watts was endowed with many natural gifts—but hair was not one of them. He 
often cracked jokes about his early baldness, and the obstinate recurrence of references to hair 
in his book on Barthes may be read within the humoristic context of such self-distancing clins 
d’oeil. Paying closer attention to the return of the hair-motif in the manuscript provides us 
with a remarkably sharp glimpse into the structure of the overall argument
1
. 
From the first pages of the manuscript, “Barthes’ approach” is explained as “a 
hermeneutics that takes a part (hair) for the whole and that interprets the film based on that 
part.  But this part (hair, etc.) is also always a sensual approach to film, an aesthetic 
approach”. As we will see, this very quote can be read as “a part” which already sketches the 
main articulations developed in the whole book. The hair-motif is first presented in the 
chapter devoted to Mythologies, rebounding on a quote drawn from “Les Romains au cinéma” 
(1954): 
 
“In Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar, all the characters are wearing fringes [ont une frange de 
cheveux sur le front].  Some have them curly, some straggly, some tufted, some oily, all have 
them well combed, and the bald are not admitted, although there are plenty to be found in 
Roman history” (26). […] Under Barthes’s lingering gaze, Mankiewicz’s film suddenly 
becomes a movie about hair, more precisely about “fringes.”  Barthes goes on to add that the 
“king-pin of the film” [artisan principal du film] is neither the scriptwriter nor the director but 
the hairdresser. The hair in Julius Caesar tells us all we need to know about the rules of 
verisimilitude governing Hollywood movies. It is both that which makes a Hollywood movie 
seem real, and the moment when the verisimilitude breaks down and “reveals a degraded 
spectacle, which is equally afraid of simple reality and of total artifice”2. 
 
This chapter devoted to cinema in the Mythologies draws its title—“A Degraded 
Spectacle”— from this quote. It points to “Barthes’ attempts to demystify the elements of the 
film—such as the “Roman haircut”—that participate in a film’s verisimilitude, its ability to 
make us believe or at least suspend disbelief”. Neither “simple reality” (messy hair or plain 
baldness) nor “total artifice”, “les franges obstinées” displayed in Mankiewicz’s Julius 
Caesar are a degraded (and degrading) spectacle insofar as they pretend to pass for real, while 
crushing all the diversity of details presented by reality under a flattening gloss of excess: 
 
                                                 
1
 A brief article sketches some of the ideas developed in the book, with a common thread already provided by the 
hair motif: Philip Watts, “Roland Barthes’s Cold-War Cinema”, SubStance 108, vol. 34, n° 3, 2005, p. 17-32. 
2
 Roland Barthes, The Eiffel Tower and Other Mythologies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, p. 
26-28. Apart from suggestion a possible link to Antoine Roquentin who, in La Nausée, feels disgusted by 
everything except looking at his own hair, Phil Watts is well aware of the fact that “contrary to Barthes’ 
assertions, there are plenty of bald Romans in the film” (he refers to Jean-Louis Calvet on this question). 
Demystification of the type practiced in the 1950s, with its constant denunciation of 
Hollywood’s artifice and excess, also participates in what we might call a left-wing asceticism.  
In the Mythologies, it is precisely the moments of excess that trigger Barthes’s demystifying 
reflex.  Wrestling, for instance, is “a spectacle of excess” (15), the Roman hairdo “overwhelms 
one with evidence” (26), Pierre Poujade’s rhetoric is “tautological” (86), everything he says he 
says twice. What Barthes’s calls “ideological abuse” (11) in the Mythologies—and which he 
will label doxa or power a few years later—is also a rhetorical abuse, a violation of aesthetic 
rules of balance, subtlety, sobriety. 
 
This critique of “mythology”, “ideology”, “doxa”, “power” or simply “la bêtise”—
which pushes Barthes pitilessly to denounce “la platitude des perruques! (here we are with 
hair again)” in Sacha Guitry’s Si Versailles m’était conté (1953)—is only the starting point of 
a complex hermeneutical construction where the hair-motif will reappear as an obsessive fil 
rouge. Phil Watts shows that Roland Barthes’ relation to cinema is much more complex than 
what could be concluded from a superficial reading of the texts he wrote about it. The 
equation Movies=Hollywood=Mythologies=US Hegemony, prevalent in Left-wing circles 
from the 1950s until today, can of course be observed at the horizon of Barthes’ 
commentaries on films in the Mythologies, as well as a certain uneasiness with the mass-
spectacle of popular cinema, contrasted to the more subtle and exclusive pleasures of reading 
literature. The main goal of Phil Watts’ book on Barthes and Cinema is to show, however, the 
many other, much more positive and contrasted, layers of the complex relation Roland 
Barthes developed with movies through the different periods of his career. 
On top of the demystifying gesture to which Barthes has long been reduced, a 
tantalizing hypothesis suggests a second layer linked to what Harold Beaver has named “camp 
poetics” in a 1981 article3. What interests me most in the return of the hair-motif is that the 
negative value attached to the bourgeois vulgarity of hairstyles in Mankiewicz’s Julius Cesar 
finds itself turned around into an aesthetic virtue of “sensuousness”, “delectation” and 
“democratic aesthetics”—in a bold move that traces a continuous path from Barthes’ film 
critique in the 1950s to Jacques Rancière’s political aesthetics of the late 1990s:  
 
Barthes’ Marxism, the seriousness of his demystifying project, the occasional revulsion 
he felt at the vulgarity and the obviousness of Hollywood movies would all seem to distance 
him from this sensitivity that began to identify itself as camp in the 1950s.  But his emphasis on 
style, on the sensuous surface of things, and on the outrageous detail (the Roman haircut for 
instance), his fascination with the excesses of rhetorical pronouncements, gangsters’ gestures or 
an actor’s makeup, his delight in the artifice of popular culture, his attraction to trashy objects 
(Barthes calls plastic a “magical” substance), his performance of a kind of democratic aesthetics 
in which anything at all can become an object of delectation, his ability to signal homosexual 
desire without declaring it (“l’euphorie d’Omo”), all these point to Barthes’ proximity to a camp 
sensibility of which Hollywood was one of the main purveyors in the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
                                                 
3
 “The term is from Harold Beaver’s 1981 essay “Homosexual Signs (In Memory of Roland Barthes) published 
in Critical Inquiry 8:1, Autumn 1981 and reprinted in Camp: Queer Aesthetics and the Performing Subject  ed. 
Fabio Cleto (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999)” (note by PW). 
The apparent disgust for the vulgarity of film as mass-entertainment is turned around 
into an appreciation for a sensorial experience provided by film as a medium, where “the 
outrageous detail” of the Roman haircut becomes a source of sensual delectation rather than 
of ideological contempt. Yet another return of the hair-motif will describe much more 
precisely and much more powerfully what is at stake in this subtle Rancierian democratic 
pleasure, which remains generally hidden under heavy layers of Marxist demystification.  
 
A Politics of Details 
It is in the articles Barthes devoted to Eisenstein’s cinema, more specifically in “Le 
troisième sens” (1970), that Phil Watts retrieves this other dimension of Barthes’ relation to 
film. And here again, it is a matter of layers: on a first level, an image displays “information”; 
on a second level, it conveys a “symbolic” meaning; on a third level, it carries a “sens obtus”, 
a third meaning Barthes illustrates with photograms taken from Eiseintein’s Battleship 
Potemkine
4
. And here again, references to hair-as-details happen to play a pivotal role: 
 
Here is what Barthes sees looking at the stills of Eisenstein’s films: “the compactness of 
the courtiers’ make-up, thick and insistent for the one, smooth and distinguished for the other; 
the former’s “stupid” nose, the latter’s finely traced eyebrows, his lank blondness, his faded pale 
complexion, the affected flatness of his hairstyle suggestive of a wig” (53). Or later, in 
commenting on stills from the funeral scene in Battleship Potemkin, Barthes insists upon the 
“obtuse meaning” of a mourning woman’s “coif, the headscarf holding in the hair […] the 
closed eyes and the convex mouth” (57).  [… ] This is the writing of the fetichist, the artist for 
whom the starting point of his commentary on cinema is always the trivial detail, the mundane.  
And this detail creates a distance and “de-naturalizes” (61) the story.  But, this similarity aside, 
“The Third Meaning” rewrites and turns inside out Mythologies. For whereas Mythologies was 
concerned with Hollywood film, “The Third Meaning” focuses on Soviet cinema. Whereas in 
the 1950s Barthes situated rhetorical excess on the side of “ideological abuse,” and the trickery 
of Hollywood, in 1970, he identifies obtuse meaning as a supplement, an “accent,” and, most 
importantly, a fold—un pli (62). And whereas in Mythologies Barthes had used the detail to 
demystify Hollywood film, in “The Third Meaning” he invests the detail with affect. The 
courtiers’ make-up, the old woman’s chignon all reveal “something touching […] or sensitive” 
(59), words Barthes labels “désuet”—“antiquated” (59), out of date, untimely, “with little that is 
revolutionary or political about them” (59).  […]  It is here that Barthes makes claims, so widely 
imitated for a few years and then so widely disdained, about how the obtuse meaning, the detail, 
“outplays meaning—subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning” (62). The 
obtuse meaning proposes “a new—rare—practice affirmed against the majority practice” (62).  
It is, Barthes concludes, a “luxury” (62), and Barthes’ essay proposes an accounting for this 
luxury, this sensation beyond meaning.  This, Barthes tells us, is the politics of art and he quotes 
Eisenstein: “Art begins the moment the creaking of a boot on the sound-track occurs against a 
different visual shot and thus gives rise to corresponding associations” (61-62).  It is a question 
of tension internal to the image itself, removed from or in any case “indifferent” (61) to story 
and to character. 
                                                 
4
 Roland Barthes, “The Third Meaning: Research Notes on Some Eisenstein Stills” in The Responsibility of 
Forms (Berkeley: UC Press, 1991). In Gilles Deleuze’ comments on this article, Barthes appears again as a film-
hater : « le cinéma il s’en fout : "J’aime pas le cinéma" ; […] ce qui l’intéresse dans le cinéma, c’est le 
photogramme » (Cours du 29 janvier 1985, disponible sur http://www2.univ-
paris8.fr/deleuze/article.php3?id_article=299). 
 This long quote summarizes the main articulation of the book on Barthes and cinema, 
which takes us from the common view of Barthes as a demystifier despising movies, to 
Barthes as an appreciator of filmic “sensation beyond meaning”. But, at the same time, this 
quote also expresses and illustrates Phil Watts’ main lesson and virtuosity on literary attention 
as a politics of details
5
. From “the trivial details” of hairstyle, as described in this 1970 article 
on Eisenstein, Phil Watts unfolds a whole “politics of art”, which remarkably accounts for 
Barthes’ four final years of teaching at the Collège de France. Let us briefly delineates three 
of its main articulations. 
1. Literary attention appears as form of fetichism: the pleasure of the text is somewhat 
perversely located in overblowing the importance of a detail. It is no coincidence if a later 
chapter quotes another article on Eisenstein, wherein Barthes jokingly mentions that “in some 
cinémathèque or other a piece of film is missing from a copy of Battleship Potemkin—the 
scene with the baby’s pram, of course—it having been cut off and stolen lovingly like a lock 
of hair, a glove or an item of women’s underwear?”6. As a summary of the chapter on Barthes 
and Eisenstein makes clear, the argument rests on a series of three terms, “the fetichist, the 
isolator, the detail”: “Art, representation, Barthes claims, happens when the spectator is able 
to cut out a segment of the visible, to isolate and fetichize—this is Barthes’ term—an object, a 
gesture or a scene”7. 
2. While, at first sight, such fetishism, isolation and details seem to be a retreat from the 
political into the personal or the aesthetical, “with little that is revolutionary or political about 
them”, they are indeed constitutive of a “politics of art”, which is “affirmed against majority 
practice”. Phil Watts’ reflection on Barthes was intimately tied to his admiration for the 
cinema of Danièle Huillet and Jean-Marie Straub, on whom we were planning to write a book. 
Literary attention teaches us to become sensitive to “the creaking of a boot on the sound-
track”, and invests such a sensitivity to details with a political dimension, insofar as it 
“outplays meaning—subverts not the content but the whole practice of meaning”. A politics of 
art is expressed in a politics of details, carrying a “tension internal to the image itself”: this is 
perfectly illustrated by Huillet and Straub’s attention to the most minute elements of the shots 
they assemble in the editing room, as documented by Pedro Costa in Où gît votre sourire 
enfoui? (2001). 
3. If the political dimension of this attitude may have eluded several generations of 
scholars, it is probably because it presents itself as a form of “luxury”, going against the grain 
of a leftist spontaneous identification with the poor, the indigent, the have-nots. As fetishism 
seemed to retreat from the collective to the personal, the reference to luxury seemed to 
abandon the alignment with the proletariat and its misery, fueling Barthes’ reputation as an 
elitist bourgeois (or culturally aristocratic) thinker. In fact, Barthes’ “accounting for this 
luxury” locates its subversive power in “sensation beyond meaning”. While this “sensation 
                                                 
5
 Naomi Schor has devoted to Roland Barthes a chapter of her book Reading in Detail. Aesthetics and the 
Feminine (1987), London, Routledge, 2007, p. 93-118. (I thank Evelyne Ender for providing this important 
reference.) 
6
 Roland Barthes, “Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein”, p. 72. 
7
 On these questions, Phil Watts acknowledges his debt to what he calls “one of the most convincing books on 
Roland Barthes”, Réda Bensmaïa The Barthes Effect: The Essay as Reflective Text.  Trans. Pat Fedkiew 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).   
beyond meaning” was first denounced by the demystifier as the excess of bourgeois 
connotation crushing interpretation under the heavy weight of Hollywood’s ideology, that 
same “sensation without meaning” is later perceived—via Eisenstein for Barthes, via Straub 
and Rancière for Phil Watts—as a luxurious reserve of aesthetic and political resistance 
against the sensory and semantic impoverishment imposed by mainstream media. 
A quarter of a century after Barthes’ death, Phil Watts re-reads him in the light of 
Huillet and Straub’s “ecological turn”, Jacques Rancière’s film critique, and Deleuzian 
politics. He is thus led to revisit a question which is still as suggestive today as it was in the 
1970s: “How can Barthes claim that the ‘luxury’ that he has identified in the detail and its 
‘obtuse meaning’ ‘does not yet belong to today’s politics but nevertheless already to 
tomorrow’s’?” I will conclude with three possible directions where literary attention can 
connect us with a still promising politics of details. 
 
The Hairy Politics of Factishes 
The first direction points towards Jacques Rancière, whom Phil Watts contributed so 
actively to promote within the US academia. As we know, the “ignorant schoolmaster” staged 
by Joseph Jacotot must refrain from “explaining” anything to his pupils. This does not mean, 
however, that he should withdraw altogether from the pedagogical stage. His function remains 
central in classroom interaction, but mostly as a focalizer and intensifier of attention: Read 
this book! Look more closely at this sentence! Did you notice this choice of word? Intellectual 
emancipation, as modelled by Rancière musing on Jacotot’s writings, puts the work of 
attention to details to the very core of its operations. As one of the main sites where the “deep 
attention” involved in close reading is practiced and nurtured in our societies, literary studies 
bring an important contribution to intellectual emancipation
8
. 
The second dimension points towards Roland Barthes’ insistence, during his lectures at 
the Collège de France, on the political necessity of caring for and about nuances
9
. From 
Mythologies to The Preparation of the Novel, Barthes ceaselessly denounced mainstream 
media as a crushing force bound to flatten the wealth of nuances which provide our senses 
and intellect with a necessary luxury of sensations beyond meaning. From the early 1950s to 
the late 1970s, Barthes remained committed to defending a politics of details, which merely 
evolved from critical demystification to sensory jubilation—as Phil Watts’ detailed analysis 
of the few writings Barthes devoted to cinema admirably shows. Barthes’ “diaphoralogy”—a 
neologism he created to label a “science of nuances”—intimately associated the study of 
literature (“codex of nuances”, “master of nuances”) with an ethics of the good life and a 
politics of resistance to mass-media homogenization. By devoting a book to Barthes and 
Cinema, Phil Watts reminds us that this “enlarged” conception of literature as an active 
culture of nuances can be found outside of the literary canon and the literary text—in films, 
but also, I would add, in TV series, bandes dessinées, popular songs or video games. He also 
reminds us, by his very method of inquiry, that the narrowing of focus on details of the object 
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 See on this point the remarkably balanced views expressed by Katherine Hayles in “Hyper and Deep Attention: 
The Generational Divide in Cognitive Modes”, Profession 2007, p. 187-199 and in How We Think?, MIT Press, 
2012. 
9
 For quotes and references, see Yves Citton, « La nuance contre l’arrogance. Impressions croisées entre Roland 
Barthes et Gilles Deleuze », in Daniel Bougnoux (ed.), Empreintes de Roland Barthes, Paris: INA éditions, 
2009, p. 147-183. 
under consideration makes literary attention a very powerful device, but also a luxury, a very 
improbable and fragile activity, condemned to hang by a hair—and, as Phil Watts knew only 
too well, hairs are often rare and precious. 
Which bring me to the third contemporary direction of the politics of details sketched by 
Barthes and enacted by Phil Watts. In a section of Pandora’s Hope (1999) entitled in French 
“Attention et prudence” (“Care and Caution” in the English version), Bruno Latour somewhat 
puzzlingly writes that “modernist objects were bald—aesthetically, morally, 
epistemologically—but the ones produced by the nonmoderns have always been hairy, 
networky, rhizomelike”10. The hair refers here to the Greek deity Kairos (opportunity, 
occasion), who wears hair hanging over his face, but who’s back of the head is bald, so that, 
like a unique occasion, nobody can grasp him once he has passed by. In this chapter, Latour 
stages an opposition between the “facts” constructed by modern science since the 17th century 
and the (pre-modern and pre-scientific) “fetishes” worshipped by supposedly “primitive” 
people. He does so, however, only to undermine this binary opposition: what we, moderns 
and nonmoderns alike, have to deal with in our daily practice and collective agency is an 
inseparable mix of facts and fetishes, which Latour baptizes as “factishes” (faitiches).  
Factishes cannot simply be observed as mere facts: they necessarily affect us in more 
than merely rational ways. These affects are but the flipside of the effects we attempt to 
impose upon our environment. Without ever referring to Latour, Phil Watts stresses the very 
“factish” understanding Barthes seems to have developed of the notion of affect, identifying it 
with “the emotion produced by the insignificant detail” causing, in a quote drawn from Victor 
Burgin, “a loss of reality, a porosity to the strangeness of the world, a hallucinatory vivacity 
of sensations”. In other words: affects manifest the fetish function still inherent to the objects 
we have to deal with day-in and day-out. Our practical world of hairy factishes is much more 
graspable than the abstract world of bald facts portrayed by the modernist scientific ideology: 
attention and prudence, care and caution help us catch opportunities well before we can 
account for their presence or their properties. But this world of hairy factishes is also a lot 
more messy, “échevelé”: bad hair days are more frequent than hair-dressed evenings. 
This final digression on Bruno Latour’s factishes provides us with a worthy object for 
literary attention, and with at least one response to our original questions. What do we do in 
our literary classrooms, to what goals and with what impact? Whether reading Racine, 
viewing Mankiewicz or Eisenstein, we train ourselves and each other to notice the hair 
remaining on our modern facts, as a trace of their lingering fetish-function. Our literary (or 
rather “litter-hairy”?) attention to details and nuances helps us identify, understand, and 
operate with the hairy factishes on which human agency relies, with their trail of affects, 
emotions, anxieties and desires.  
We now understand why we cannot be attentifs to each other’s gestures without being 
attentionnés to each other’s affects—as was Phil Watts, and so generously. Like the god 
Kairos, Phil Watts left no hair hanging on the back of his head for us to grab and retain him 
among us. Our loss is enormous, but his legacy is luxuriously hairy: countless threads remain 
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 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies, Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1999, 
p. 288. 
to be pulled, explored and weaved in our loving memories of him, of his teaching and of his 
scholarly work. 
 
